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23 FEB 1965

*JCS - Requirements*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Domestic Operations Division

SUBJECT: Project WUBENOT

*from  
C/SOD*

- REFERENCES:
- a) WTS Memo to DD/P, 22 Dec. 64;  
Reconsideration of CIA's Acceptance  
of JCS Wartime UT Requirements
  - b) DD/P Memo to Chairman, JCS, 20 Dec. 64;  
Unconventional Warfare Planning

1. As stated in References, there is common agreement within the CS that WUBENOT external agent assets do not meet JCS wartime UT requirements. As a consequence the JCS have undertaken a re-examination of the problem of requirements, and it is our understanding that the DD Division has suspended further recruitment and training of agent reservists to meet these requirements.

2. Two basic problems have come out of these developments. First, there is the question of what can be made of the existing WUBENOT agent reservists in current operations; and, more importantly, there is the question of what future use can be made of the WUBENOT mechanism.

3. As regards the agent reservists now on the WUBENOT rolls, in our view certain limiting factors inhibit their general usefulness in contingency operations.

a. All of these agents have been recruited to serve in a Hot War situation in areas related to their ethnic origin. It has already been determined that some are willing to serve in other operations & capacities and goals are not. Agents in this latter category obviously have no utility in current operations, and, while it may be expedient to hold them on the rolls until the matter of JCS wartime requirements has been resolved, it would appear to be equally evident now that they should be released if as a result of the JCS review there is no longer a requirement for the agents willing to serve in a Hot War capacity only.

*75%  
25%*

*No alternative*

*Agree*

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SECRET

-2-

b. All of these agents have been trained primarily for employment behind enemy lines in wartime. Their utility in a covert or clandestine role during the Cold War, therefore, will require some reorientation and retraining. The WUBROT mechanism, as a separate entity, is not required in order to accomplish this. The regular training establishment has that capability.

c. Next, if not all, of these agents are U. S. citizens which means that where the U. S. finds them, so concealed they can be used only with the utmost circumspection, and then in situations only where there is little risk of capture or operational compromise. Actually, when U. S. policy permits the use of U. S. citizens, and language or other requirements are not overriding, certain categories of U. S. Special Forces personnel or MARINE personnel could be used with greater operational utility.

4. Despite these limitations, an effort is being made to utilize qualified WUBROT agent reservists in current operations. Recently an attempt to place twenty of these agents with AF for use in the Congo is an example of this effort, and it also is an example of some of the problems encountered. We are prepared to continue this effort either to place these agents in current operations, or possibly to absorb them under some other project, if policy permits use of this category of U. S. citizens.

5. In regard to the future utility of the WUBROT mechanism and the WUBROT concept, this is decidedly discouraging as far as continuing this activity as a separate project to meet future Cold War requirements. In the two Area Divisions (AF and EU) now faced with urgent needs for contingency assets, there are political and operational security reasons which severely limit the recruitment of agent reservists within the U. S. So full unferenced contingency assignments. There are many valid operational reasons for these limitations, and SCD is basically in agreement with the position which the Divisions have taken. Apart from the Area Divisions, SCD has its own requirements for contingency assets; but here again, through our own projects

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

we already have devised the means, or are in process of devising the means, for satisfying these requirements more directly and more effectively than can be done through WUWFOOT. In these circumstances we cannot foresee any new Cold War requirements being levied on WUWFOOT.

// How?

3. We all recognize, of course, that within the overall WUWFOOT mechanism there are facilities and personnel, apart from the agent assets, which have a utility that transcends the bounds of the WUWFOOT project. Pending a resolution of the current JCS review of Hot War requirements, we feel the WUWFOOT mechanism per se should not be dismantled. If the JCS determine that there is no longer a need for the product of the WUWFOOT project as now constituted, it is recommended that WUWFOOT be terminated in its existing form. It is recommended that the future disposition of the training facilities and the training personnel be a matter of negotiation with GNS. It is the view of SOD that Pickett has a continuing utility to the GNS. Reassignment of the remaining personnel should be handled by the appropriate Career Service.

// We are already reviewing it!

Major General, USA  
Chief, Special Operations Division

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